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HAS DELAWARE BECOME THE “NEW” 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS? THE 
UNFORESEEN CONSEQUENCES OF THE AIA 
Fabio E. Marino† & Teri H.P. Nguyen†† 
Abstract 
To stem the rising tide of patent suits brought by non-practicing 
entities (NPEs), Congress enacted the anti-joinder provisions of the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) while, at nearly the same 
time, the Federal Circuit issued a series of decisions making it easier 
for defendants to transfer multi-defendant cases filed by NPEs away 
from the Eastern District of Texas.  The unexpected result of these 
initiatives, however, has been that NPEs have selected the District of 
Delaware as their new “forum of choice,” making it the most popular 
forum for patent litigation in the country and displacing the Eastern 
District of Texas. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On September 16, 2011, President Obama signed into law the 
2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), aimed in part at 
curbing patent suits brought by non-practicing entities (NPEs).
1
  Since 
that time, however, the number of patent cases filed in the District of 
Delaware has risen steadily, making it the most popular venue for 
patent litigation in the country, a position previously held by the 
Eastern District of Texas for many years.
2
 
Ironically, the AIA’s anti-joinder provisions, codified at 35 
U.S.C. Section 299, were enacted by Congress to prevent patent 
holders from joining multiple defendants in the same action based 
merely on the assertion of the same patent(s).
3
  In the decade 
preceding the enactment of the AIA, in fact, NPEs (sometimes 
derogatorily referred to as “patent trolls” by the patent defense bar) 
had made it a practice to sue multiple defendants and, in some 
instances, even entire industries, in a single patent infringement suit in 
the plaintiff friendly courts of the Eastern District of Texas.
4
  When 
defendants with little to no connection to that forum tried to transfer 
cases to more defendant friendly jurisdictions, courts in the Eastern 
District of Texas often relied on the judicial economies achieved by 
having the same court address the issues common to all defendants 
(e.g., invalidity or claim construction) to deny transfer motions.
5
 
While the AIA was making its way through Congress, however, 
the Federal Circuit granted a number of requests by defendants to 
transfer patent cases out of the Eastern District of Texas and, in the 
process, articulated a more lenient standard for transferring cases out 
of jurisdictions with little connection to the case.
6
 
The cumulative effect of the enactment of the AIA with the more 
permissive jurisprudence on motions to transfer was to make it harder 
for NPEs to file multi-defendant cases in the Eastern District of Texas 
and keep them there.  As a result, NPEs started looking for a new 
venue to file multi-defendant actions.  Recent survey data on new 
 
 1. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2012). 
 2. Alex Lawson, Delaware Eclipses Texas as Patent Hot Spot, LAW360 (Sept. 16, 
2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/473097/delaware-eclipses-texas-as-patent-hot-spot. 
 3. 35 U.S.C. § 299. 
 4. Michael Liu, Joinder Under the AIA: Shifting Non-Practicing Entity Patent 
Assertions Away from Small Businesses, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 489, 500-02 
(2012). 
 5. Id.; see, e.g., In re EMC Corp., 677 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 6. See, e.g., In re EMC Corp., 677 F.3d at 1360; In re Link_A_Media Devices Corp., 
662 F.3d 1221, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Altera Corp., 494 F. App’x 52, 53 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
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patent suit filings suggests that NPE’s have found a new “forum of 
choice” in the District of Delaware, likely because most large U.S. 
corporations are incorporated in that jurisdiction and the courts in that 
district have been hesitant to grant motions to transfer filed by 
Delaware corporations.
7
  This article examines how the enactment of 
the AIA’s anti-joinder provisions and the recent transfer jurisprudence 
by the Federal Circuit have combined to bring about this dramatic 
shift in the geographic distribution of patent litigation. 
I. THE NPE OR “PATENT TROLL” 
Non-practicing entities (NPEs) are companies that own patents, 
but instead of making products that practice the patents, they generate 
revenue by licensing and asserting patents against alleged infringers 
to extract license fees.
8
  The 2012 NPE Activity Report prepared by 
RPX Corporation defines NPEs to include: (1) patent assertion 
entities (PAEs), (2) universities and research institutions, (3) 
individual inventors, and (4) non-competing entities (NCEs) or 
operating companies asserting patents outside their areas of products 
or services.
9
 
According to a report by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
the NPEs’ business model focuses on “buying and asserting patents 
against companies that have already begun using them.”10  As a result, 
the NPEs’ business model depends on generating more revenue from 
licensing and enforcement activities than the costs of obtaining such 
revenue. 
II. THE COST OF LITIGATION 
NPEs assert that by buying patents from individual inventors, 
they enable small inventors to profit from their inventions when they 
 
 7. 35 U.S.C. § 299; David O. Taylor et al., The America Invents Act:  Target, the 
Eastern District of Texas, 15 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 471, 482 (2012); Erin Coe, Texas 
Hang-Ups May Boost Patent Suits in Delaware, LAW360 (May 8, 2009, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/100540/texas-hang-ups-may-boost-patent-suits-in-delaware. 
 8. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, & OFFICE OF 
SCI. & TECH. POLICY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. 
INNOVATION (2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf. 
 9. RPX CORP., 2012 NPE ACTIVITY REPORT 7 (2013), available at 
http://www.rpxcorp.com/siteFiles/SiteManager/0BF995E82CFF591EE80EFE8AC69259E7.pdf. 
 10. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE:  ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE 
AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 50-51 (2011); BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 
R42668, AN OVERVIEW OF THE “PATENT TROLLS” DEBATE 1 (2013). 
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would otherwise lack the abilities to do so on their own.  Nathan 
Myhrvold, the CEO of Intellectual Ventures, articulated the NPEs’ 
views on this subject in a recent interview: 
Q: You just buy up patents and then you sue people, and I don’t 
understand how that helps innovation and creativity in the world. 
A: If people create something and don’t get paid, that’s a problem. 
It’s very hard for individual inventors to get paid.  For the same 
reason that private equity is valuable—broadly, that’s a good 
thing—in the case of patents, many that own them aren’t in a good 
position to take the next step.”
11
 
Even opponents of NPE litigation have recognized that in the 
past:  
[S]ome NPEs have played a valuable role in bringing innovations 
from small inventors to market.  Some inventors lack the resources 
and expertise needed to successfully license their technologies or, 
if necessary, to enforce their patents.  NPEs provide a way for 
these inventors to earn rents that they might not otherwise realize, 
thus providing them with greater incentives to innovate.
12
 
However, empirical studies have shown that NPE litigation does 
not provide incentives for innovation.  For example, one study found 
that NPEs impose costs on large technology companies and many 
small and medium firms, “making it even less likely that innovative 
start-ups are net beneficiaries of NPE activity.”13  That same study 
reported that small and medium-sized companies make up 90% of the 
defendants sued by NPEs.
14
  Another study reported that at least one 
company in the health information space had ceased innovation and 
development altogether while fending off patent infringement threats 
by an NPE.
15
 
Professors Bessen and Meurer identified in their study three 
 
 11. Darren Murph, Intellectual Ventures’ Nathan Myhrvold Defends Patent Trolling, 
Calls Tech Industry Immature, ENGADGET (May 30, 2012, 2:33 PM), 
http://www.engadget.com/2012/05/30/intellectual-ventures-nathan-myhrvold-defends-patent-
trolling/. 
 12. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Cost of NPE Disputes (Boston Univ. 
School of Law, Paper No. 12-34, 2012), available at 
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/documents/BessenJ_MeurerM06251
2rev062812.pdf. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See  id. 
 15. OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POLICY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT 
ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION (2013). 
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losses associated with NPE litigation.
16
  First, the risk of litigation is a 
disincentive to innovation.
17
  The anticipated risk of future lawsuit-
related losses is factored into the cost of a firm’s development of new 
technology and products, particularly for firms that invest heavily in 
research and development (R&D).
18
  In fact, Bessen and Meurer 
reported that the more a firm spent on R&D, the more likely it was to 
be sued for patent infringement.
19
  Their study concluded that even if 
incentives provided by NPE litigation to small inventors “were much 
more fertile than incentives provided to large technology firms—
producing two, three or even ten times as many innovations—the 
incentives flowing to small inventors would not offset the much larger 
disincentives imposed on the technology firms.”20 
Second, the threat of NPE litigation may even hurt independent 
inventors who seek to sell or license their patents to larger firms.
21
  
The expectation of an NPE lawsuit may depress the amount a licensee 
or buyer is willing to pay for a patent.
22
  Third, Bessen and Meurer 
posit that:  
NPE activity may skew the research agenda of small firms away 
from disruptive technologies and toward mainstream technology 
and associated patents that can be asserted against big incumbents.  
Even worse, small firms are encouraged to divert investment from 
genuine invention toward simply obtaining broad and vague 
patents that might one day lead to a credible, if weak, lawsuit.
23
 
Others investigating the “myths” about NPEs regarding benefits 
they provide to society, such as Michael Risch, have found little 
supporting evidence.
24
  For example, the myth that NPEs are 
“vindicating the rights of small companies forced out of business by 
infringers” is unsupported by the evidence.25  Risch’s study showed 
that, in fact, very few of the initial owners of the patents later 
acquired by NPEs actually failed, and in fact, the patents were held 
 
 16. James Bessen, Jennifer Ford, & Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social Costs of 
Patent Trolls (Boston Univ. School of Law, Paper No. 11-45, 2011) available at 
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/Bessen-Ford-Meurer-troll.html. 
 17. See id. 
 18. See id. 
 19. Id. at 21. 
 20. Bessen et al., supra note 16. 
 21. Id. at 22. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457 (2012). 
 25. Id. 
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for a long time before they were asserted.
26
 
The social benefits NPEs may offer, if any, are minimal and 
outweighed by the private and social costs they impose.  Bessen and 
Meurer found that in 2011, the enforcement activities of patent trolls 
cost defendants and licensees $29 billion, a dramatic 400% increase 
from $7 billion in 2005.
27
  The AIPLA recently reported that median 
litigation cost for defending claims of patent infringement by NPEs 
had a median of $4 million per case where the amount in controversy 
exceeded $25 million (Figure 1).
28
 
 
Figure 1. 
 
Even though defending a patent infringement action is 
expensive, over a third of the costs imposed by NPEs on defendants 
involve assertions that do not even go to court.
29
  Surveys of 
companies threatened by NPEs, but that settled without litigation, 
found that costs incurred resulted mainly from legal fees and 
settlement costs to patent holders, including costs associated with 
NPE-specific patent buying programs, clearance searches, and re-
examinations of NPE patents.
30
  Whether resolved in or out of court, 
it is clear that the direct and indirect costs of NPE assertions refute the 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. YEH, supra note 10, at 2; Bessen & Meurer, supra note 12 at 18-19. 
 28. AM. INTEL. PROP. LAW ASS’N., REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 35 (2013). 
 29. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 12. 
 30. Id. 
Amount In Controversy End of Discovery Inclusive, All costs 
Less than $1 million $300,000 $600,000 
$1-$10 million $750,000 $1.25 million 
$10-$25 million $1.5 million $2.4 million 
$1-$25 million $983,000 $1.75 million 
More than $25 million $2.5 million $4 million 
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proposition that NPEs play a significant role in promoting innovation. 
Although prosecuting a patent infringement action is also 
expensive, by suing several defendants in single lawsuit, NPEs 
capitalize on economies of scale
31
 and charge forth with multiple 
lawsuits for the price of one. 
NPEs using such tactics are typically willing to settle for small 
payments, often no more than the amount a defendant would spend on 
legal fees to defend the case.
32
 
III. LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS 
Research published by PricewaterhouseCoopers, based on 
statistics collected from 1995 through 2012, found that while NPEs 
had an overall success rate of 24% at summary judgment, as 
compared to 34% for practicing entities, both had the same 66% 
success rate at trial.
33
 
The majority of NPE litigations, however, result in settlements.
34
  
Not surprisingly, the majority of these settlements were for amounts 
below the defendants’ estimated cost of defense.35  This may be an 
indicator that at least some of the NPE-initiated litigation is driven by 
financial considerations rather than the merits.  For example, in Eon-
Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp,
36
 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s finding that Eon-Net filed an objectively baseless 
infringement action in bad faith and for an improper extortion-like 
purpose: 
In addition to finding that Eon-Net filed an objectively baseless 
infringement action, the district court also determined that Eon-Net 
filed the lawsuit in bad faith and for an improper purpose.  In 
particular, the district court found that Eon-Net’s case against 
Flagstar had “indicia of extortion” because it was part of Eon-Net’s 
 
 31. Ahmed J. Davis & Karolina Jesien, The Balance of Power in Patent Law: Moving 
Towards Effectiveness in Addressing Patent Troll Concerns, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 835, 850 (2012). 
 32. See, e.g., Parallel Networks LLC v. Oriental Trading Company, Inc., No. 6:10-CV-
00474 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2010). 
 33. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2013 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 5 (2013), available 
at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2013-patent-litigation-
study.pdf (finding that NPEs have been successful 24% of the time overall versus 34% for 
practicing entities, due to the relative lack of success for NPEs at summary judgment. However, 
both have about a two-thirds success rate at trial). 
 34. Bessen et al., supra note 16, at 16; YEH, supra note 10, at 12. 
 35. See YEH, supra note 10; John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent 
Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 694 (2011). 
 36. Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1326-27 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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history of filing nearly identical patent infringement complaints 
against a plethora of diverse defendants, where Eon-Net followed 
each filing with a demand for a quick settlement at a price far 
lower than the cost to defend the litigation. 
  The record supports the district court’s finding that Eon-Net 
acted in bad faith by exploiting the high cost to defend complex 
litigation to extract a nuisance value settlement from Flagstar.
37
 
The Federal Circuit went on to describe the uneven power 
enjoyed by NPEs: 
In addition to its ability to impose high costs to defend against its 
meritless claims, Eon-Net placed little at risk when filing suit.  As 
a non-practicing entity, Eon-Net was generally immune to 
counterclaims for patent infringement, antitrust, or unfair 
competition because it did not engage in business activities that 
would potentially give rise to those claims.  And while Eon-Net 
risked licensing revenue should its patents be found invalid or if a 
court narrowly construed the patents’ claims to exclude valuable 
targets, Eon-Net did not face any business risk resulting from the 
loss of patent protection over a product or process.  Its patents 
protected only settlement receipts, not its own products.
38
 
As another example, in a case in which the plaintiff sued 124 
defendants for infringing a single patent, “the Court asked plaintiff 
why it elected to sue such a large number of defendants at once, as 
opposed to the more common approach of selecting a few target 
defendants to proceed against first.”39  In response, the Plaintiff, an 
NPE, responded that “its strategy made sense from a cost view” and 
that “its strategy was not to go after one defendant and ask for $30 
million” but “to go after a lot of defendants, get those issues resolved, 
hopefully by settlement.”40  Tellingly, “[w]hen the Court specifically 
inquired about what drives Plaintiff’s early settlement demands, 
Plaintiff indicated that its process involves an analysis of Defendants’ 
sales as well as Defendants’ cost of defense.”41 
Another Plaintiff lawyer explained the “cost of defense 
settlement demand” as follows: 
The more a patent is litigated, it tends to decrease in value as 
 
 37. Id. 
38.  Id. at 1328. 
 39. See Memorandum Opinion and Order at 3, Parallel Networks LLC v. Oriental 
Trading Company, Inc., No. 6:10-CV-00474 (E.D. Tex., Mar. 15, 2011). 
 40. Id. at 3-4. 
 41. Id. at 4. 
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people come up with better prior art or over-analyze the thing.  An 
NPE [non-practice entity] intuitively understands that we could go 
for triples or home runs, but we can also go for singles and get a 
good return and work on other things. . . . The licensor is of the 
view that we don’t want to fight so price at a level to where it is 
attractive not to fight.
42
 
Said differently, NPEs are “willing to take less than they are 
entitled to in order to maintain the viability of the patent.”43  As 
discussed further below, the AIA’s anti-joinder provision was 
expected to discourage cost-of-defense suits by forcing plaintiffs to 
bring multiple suits against each of the alleged infringers separately, 
thereby increasing the NPEs’ litigation costs.44  Unlike companies 
that make products, NPEs are not vulnerable to counter claims or 
competitive harm to their business and/or reputation resulting from 
their involvement in litigation.  Thus, the AIA attempted to level the 
playing field by making it more expensive for an NPE to assert a 
patent. 
IV. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 20(a)(2): PERMISSIVE 
JOINDER OF PARTIES 
Before the enactment of the AIA, Rule 20(a)(2) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure governed joinder of defendants in one 
action.
45
  Under Rule 20(a)(2), persons may be joined in one action as 
defendants only if: 
(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or 
in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same 
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; 
and 
(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise 
in the action.
46
 
District courts were split in their application of Rule 20(a)(2), 
however, with courts in the Eastern District of Texas taking a 
different view than those in other jurisdictions.  For example, in 
MyMail v. AOL, the plaintiff sued multiple defendants in a single 
 
 42. David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 
64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 371 (2012) (ellipsis in original). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 382-83. 
 45. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(2). 
 46. Id. 
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action alleging infringement of one patent.
47
  Defendants moved to 
sever and transfer arguing that the claims did not arise out of the same 
transaction or occurrence as the claims against the other defendants.
48
  
The district court disagreed and concluded that the requirements of 
Rule 20 were met where “there is some connection or logical 
relationship between the various transactions or occurrences,” which 
“exists if there is some nucleus of operative facts or law.”49  In 
MyMail, Rule 20’s joinder requirements were satisfied because all 
defendants shared a common legal question concerning the scope of 
the patent.
50
 
In Eolas v. Adobe, another Eastern District of Texas court denied 
defendants’ request to sever because “[a]ll defendants are accused of 
infringing the patents in suit, and adjudicating infringement will 
require construing the claims and evaluating the patents’ innovation 
over the prior art.  Thus, determining defendants’ liability will involve 
substantially overlapping questions of law and fact.”51 
Courts in other jurisdictions, however, demanded more than the 
mere allegation that defendants infringe the same patent for purposes 
of joinder.  In Rudd v. Lux Products, the district court stated that 
“[a]fter researching the issue, the Court determines that [the Eastern 
District of Texas’s] approach [to Rule 20] is in the minority.”52  
Indeed, the Rudd court reasoned that the MyMail approach 
“eviscerates the same transaction or occurrence requirement and 
makes it indistinguishable from the requirement that there be a 
common question of law or fact.”  Allegations that unrelated 
defendants infringe the same patents—and even sold similar 
products—do not, without more, satisfy the requirements of Rule 
20.
53
 
 
 47. MyMail, Ltd. v. AOL, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 455 (E.D. Tex. 2004). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 456. 
 50.Id. at 457. 
 51. Memorandum Opinion and Order at *2, Eolas Technologies, Inc. v. Adobe Systems, 
Inc., No. 6:09-CV-446, 2010 WL 3835762 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2010); see also Sprint 
Communications Co. v. TheGlobe.com, Inc., 233 F.R.D. 615 (D. Kan. 2006); Adrain v. Genetec 
Inc., No. 2:08-CV-423, 2009 WL3063414 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2009); Better Educ. Inc. v. 
Einstruction Corp., No. 2-08-CV-446-TJW-CE, 2010 WL 918307 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2010); 
Mannatech, Inc.v. Country Life, LLC, No. 3:10-CV-533-O, 2010 WL 2944574 (N.D. Tex. July 
26, 2010); Alford Safety Services, Inc., v. Hot-Hed, Inc., No. 10-1319, 2010 WL 3418233 (E.D. 
La. Aug. 24, 2010). 
 52. Rudd v. Lux Products Corp., No. 09-CV-6957, 2011 WL 148052, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 
12, 2011). 
 53. JOAO Control & Monitoring Sys. of Cal. v. ACTI Corp., No. SA CV10-01909 DOC 
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Courts outside the Eastern District of Texas have acknowledged 
the prejudice and dilemma imposed on defendants from having to 
litigate patent infringement actions together.  In WiAV Networks, a 
court in the Northern District of California described the NPE 
situation as follows: “Each defendant has simply been thrown into a 
mass pit with others to suit plaintiff’s convenience.  In this 
connection, the accused defendants—who will surely have competing 
interests and strategies—are also entitled to present individualized 
assaults on questions of non-infringement, invalidity, and claim 
construction.”54 
In 2012, the Federal Circuit finally addressed the joinder issues 
arising from the denial of defendants’ motion to sever and transfer in 
In re EMC Corp., where it reversed the Eastern District of Texas 
decision denying severance of eighteen independent defendants.
55
  
The Federal Circuit held that joinder is not appropriate where 
different products or processes are involved: “We agree that joinder is 
not appropriate where different products or processes are involved.  
Joinder of independent defendants is only appropriate where the 
accused products or processes are the same in respects relevant to the 
patent.  But the sameness of the accused products or processes is not 
sufficient.”56  Claims against defendants can only be joined if “the 
facts underlying the claim of infringement asserted against each 
defendant share an aggregate of operative facts.”57  Absent an “actual 
link” between the facts, “independently developed products using 
differently sourced parts are not part of the same transaction, even if 
they are otherwise coincidentally identical.”58 
Although In re EMC was decided before the enactment of the 
AIA, and thus applied only Rule 20, it nevertheless reached a similar 
conclusion as it would have under Section 299 of the AIA: joinder 
requires more than the mere allegation that the same patent is 
infringed. 
 
(RNBx), 2011 WL 1519277, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2011); WiAV Networks LLC v. 3Com 
Corp., No. C 10-3448-WHA, 2010 WL 3895047, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2010) (“[N]umerous 
courts have found that ‘joinder is often improper where [multiple] competing businesses have 
allegedly infringed the same patent by selling different products.’”). 
 54. WiAV Networks, 2010 WL 3895047, at *2. 
 55. In re EMC Corp., 677 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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V. ENACTMENT OF THE AIA 
The split of authority among the district courts regarding the 
construction of Rule 20(a) was expressly resolved by the signing into 
law of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA).
59
  Section 299 of 
the AIA, in fact, concerns the joinder of accused infringers and sets 
forth what allegations are insufficient to bind independent defendants 
together in one action or to consolidate separate actions for trial: 
(a) Joinder of Accused Infringers—With respect to any civil action 
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, other than 
action or trial in which an act of infringement under section 
271(e)(2) has been pled, parties that are accused infringers may be 
joined in one action as defendants or counterclaim defendants, or 
have their actions consolidated for trial, or counterclaim 
defendants only if: 
(1) any right to relief is asserted against the parties jointly, 
severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the 
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 
occurrences relating to the making, using, importing into the 
United States, offering for sale, or selling of the same accused 
product or process; and 
(2) questions of fact common to all defendants or counterclaim 
defendants will arise in the action. 
(b) Allegations insufficient for joinder—For purposes of this 
subsection, accused infringers may not be joined in one action as 
defendants or counterclaim defendants, or have their actions 
consolidated for trial, based solely on allegations that they each 
have infringed the patent or patents-in-suit. 
(c) Waiver—a party that is an accused infringer may waive the 
limitations set forth in this section with respect to that party.
60
 
It is clear that Congress enacted Section 299 not only with NPEs 
in mind, but also to address the problems arising from multi-
defendant patent litigation practice in the Eastern District of Texas.
61
  
Indeed, the legislative history of the AIA confirms as much: 
Section 299 of the AIA legislatively abrogates the construction 
of Rule 20(a) adopted in MyMail, Ltd. v. America Online, Inc., 
223 F.R.D. 455 (E.D. Tex. 2004); Sprint Communications Co. v. 
Theglobe.com, Inc., 233 F.R.D. 615 (D. Kan. 2006); Adrain v. 
 
 59. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2012). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 55 n.61 (2011). 
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Genetec Inc., 2009 WL3063414 (E.D. Tex. September 22, 2009); 
Better Educ. Inc. v. Einstruction Corp., 2010 WL 918307 (E.D. 
Tex. March 10, 2010); Mannatech, Inc. v. Country Life, LLC, 2010 
WL 2944574 (N.D. Tex. July 26, 2010); Alford Safety Services, 
Inc., v. Hot-Hed, Inc., 2010 WL 3418233 (E.D. La. August 24, 
2010); and Eolas Technologies, Inc. v. Adobe Systems, Inc., 2010 
WL 3835762 (E.D. Tex. September 28, 2010)—effectively 
conforming these courts’ jurisprudence to that followed by a 
majority of jurisdictions. See generally Rudd v. Lux Products 
Corp., 2011 WL 148052 (N.D. Ill. January 12, 2011).
62
 
While closely following the language of Rule 20, Section 299(a) 
adds the further requirement that the claim must arise out of the same 
transaction relating to the same accused product or process.
63
  The 
requirement that the accused infringers be linked by more than a 
patent infringement allegation is consistent with the procedures 
followed by a majority of jurisdictions.  Courts have traditionally held 
that claims against separate defendants arise out of the same 
transaction or occurrence only when the claims “refer[] to 
similarit[ies] in the factual background of a claim.”64 
Although the legislative history of the AIA devoted relatively 
little attention to the joinder issue, it is plain from the text that Section 
299(b) “represents Congress’s effort to limit the ability of plaintiffs to 
file multi-defendant patent infringement suits.”65  Section 299(b) 
expressly precludes plaintiffs from bringing suits against multiple 
defendants where the only common links are issues stemming from 
the allegation that they infringe the same patent.  The House Report 
accompanying H.R. 1249 (the bill that resulted in the AIA) explained 
 
 62. Id. (emphasis added). 
 63. See 35 U.S.C. § 299. 
 64. Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1350 (9th Cir. 1997) (emphasis added); see also, 
EIT Holdings LLC v. Yelp!, Inc., No. C 10-05623, 2011 WL 2192820, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 
2011) (finding joinder improper where defendants’ “websites implement different 
functionalities, through different software, that works in different ways”); Sorensen v. DMS 
Holdings, Inc., No. 08-CV-559, 2010 WL 4909615, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2010) (“alleging a 
common manufacturer and infringement of the same patent is not enough to support joinder 
where defendants are unrelated companies, selling different products”); Children’s Network, 
LLC v. PixFusion LLC, 722 F. Supp. 2d 404, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Joinder of unrelated 
parties into one action is generally inappropriate where, as here, the infringement of the same 
patent is alleged, but the products are different.”); N.J. Mach. Inc. v. Alford Indus., Inc., No. 89-
1879, 1991 WL 340196, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 1991) (finding joinder of “claims of infringement 
against unrelated defendants, involving different machines” improper where “the plaintiff fails 
to adequately allege or support any connection or substantial similarity between the machines of 
the proposed defendants”). 
 65. MAYA ECKSTEIN ET AL., THE (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES OF THE AIA JOINDER 
PROVISION (2012). 
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that, “New 299 also clarifies that joinder will not be available if it [is] 
based solely on allegations that a defendant has infringed the patent(s) 
in question.”66  The debate on the floor of the Senate specifically 
emphasized that infringement of the same patent was never enough to 
satisfy Rule 20, even before Section 299, outside the Eastern District 
of Texas: 
Section 19(d) of the present bill adds a new section 299 to title 35.  
This new section bars joinder of accused infringers as 
codefendants, or consolidation of their cases for trial, if the only 
common fact and transaction among the defendants is that they are 
alleged to have infringed the same patent.  This provision 
effectively codifies current law as it has been applied everywhere 
outside of the Eastern District of Texas.  See Rudd v. Lux 
Products Corp., 2011 WL 148052 (N.D. Ill. January 12, 2011), 
and the committee report for this bill at pages 54 through 55.
67
 
Section 299 thus makes it legally and economically more 
difficult to bring suit against multiple unrelated defendants.  First, 
under the AIA, in order to bring suit against multiple defendants at 
the same time, the NPE must allege joint and/or several liability 
among the multiple defendants and the alleged infringement must 
relate to the same transaction or occurrence . . . relating to the 
infringement of the same accused product or process.
68
  Second, 
NPEs will incur additional administrative costs filing and maintaining 
multiple lawsuits, sometimes in different venues.  Having to split 
patent cases across multiple venues will increase the costs and 
burdens of litigation.
69
  Furthermore, as noted above, “[t]he more a 
patent is litigated, [the more] it tends to decrease in value as people 
come up with better prior art or over-analyze the thing.”70 
VI. NPES CONTINUE TO FILE RECORD NUMBER OF PATENT 
INFRINGEMENT CASES 
In the days before the AIA went into effect, there was a 
noticeable spike in patent filings in the Eastern District of Texas.  
Many viewed the move as a “rush to the courthouse” to take 
 
 66. H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, at 55 (2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-112hrpt98/pdf/CRPT-112hrpt98-pt1.pdf. 
 67. 157 Cong. Rec. S5429 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl) (emphasis 
added). 
 68. 35 U.S.C. § 299. 
 69. Schwartz, supra note 42, at 383; Marla Butler, Strategies for Dealing with the Non-
Joinder Provision, MANAGING IP, March 2012, at 42. 
 70. Schwartz, supra note 42, at 371. 
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advantage of the Eastern District-style multi-defendant practice 
before it went away forever.  The weekly number of complaints filed 
in the Eastern District of Texas between September 2 and September 
16, 2011, was over one hundred—nearly double the average over the 
preceding year.
71
 
Indeed, the overall number of patent infringement cases brought 
by NPEs since the AIA was enacted has increased.  In 2011, a total of 
1551 NPE patent cases were filed nationally.
72
  In 2012, a record 
3054 new NPE patent infringement cases were filed, a 97% increase 
over 2011, and a 388% increase over 2008.
73
  This increase, however, 
may be an artifact of the AIA.  For example, as one study suggested, 
the “legislative changes could have the effect of inflating the number 
of cases filed, without reflecting a true increase in the amount of 
litigation.”74  In other words, the post-AIA filings are likely due to 
NPEs filing multiple single-defendant cases rather than a single 
multiple-defendant lawsuit.  This is supported by RPX data showing a 
61% reduction in the number of defendants sued in each case since 
2011: the 1551 NPE patent cases filed nationally in 2011 had an 
average of 3.6 defendants per case, whereas the 3054 NPE patent 
cases filed in 2012 had an average of 1.4 defendants per case.
75
  In 
summary, the total number of defendants sued by NPEs decreased by 
18% from 2011 to 2012, from 5329 defendants to 4351 defendants, 
respectively.
76
  This comports with a recent Lex Machina study 
showing that the number of defendants sued by “patent monetization 
entities”77 in 2012 actually decreased from 2011 (Figure 2).78 
 
 
 
 
 
 71. INTEL. PROP. OWNERS ASS’N, IMPACT OF THE MISJOINDER PROVISION OF THE 
AMERICA INVENTS ACT 12 (2012) (citing data retrieved from Docket Navigator for the Eastern 
District of Texas). 
 72. RPX CORP., supra note 9, at 11. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Robin Feldman, Tom Ewing & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of 
Patent Monetization Entities, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK 57 (April 9, 2013), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2247195. 
 75. RPX CORP., supra note 9, at 11. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Feldman et al., supra note 74.  The term, “patent monetization entities” as used in this 
study describes “those whose primary focus is deriving income from licensing and litigation, as 
opposed to making products.”  Id. at 19-20. 
 78. Id. 
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Figure 2. 
 
Year Number of Defendants 
2007 2640 
2008 1809 
2011 6208 
2012 4475 
 
 
One possible explanation for the increase in 2011 and 
subsequent drop in 2012 is the “rush to the courthouse” phenomenon 
caused by the enactment of the AIA.  Other commentators, however, 
have suggested that the enactment of Section 299 was at least 
partially successful in reducing the amount of NPE litigation activity, 
an indication that NPEs are now more discriminating when picking 
potential defendants.
79
 
VII.SECTION 299 OF THE AIA DOES NOT APPLY TO PRE-TRIAL 
CONSOLIDATION 
When H.R. 1249 (the bill that resulted in the AIA) was originally 
introduced, it “applied only to joinder of defendants in one action.”80  
But in a manager’s amendment, the bill was extended to also bar 
consolidation for trials of separate actions adding the phrase “or have 
their actions consolidated for trial.”81  Senator Kyl’s initial skepticism 
with respect to the proposed expansion of the bill to preclude 
consolidation for trial was resolved after a review of legal authority 
that “reveals that under current law, even if parties cannot be joined 
as defendants under rule 20, their cases can still be consolidated for 
 
 79. See Lisa Shuchman, Study: Eastern District of Texas Reclaims Top Spot for New 
Patent Suit Filings, THE RECORDER (Jan. 15, 2013), 
http://www.therecorder.com/id=1202584588647 (citing analysis by James Pistorino reporting 
the total number of defendants in all new suits in all districts nationwide declined by 15.4% 
from 14,201 in 2011 to 12,013 in 2012); RPX CORP., supra note 9 (reporting the total number of 
defendants added in 2012 decreased by 17% from 2011 total). 
 80. 157 Cong. Rec. S5429 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 81. Id. 
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trial under rule 42.”82  Upon such review, Senator Kyl acknowledged: 
If a court that was barred from joining defendants in one action 
could instead simply consolidate their cases for trial under rule 42, 
section 299’s purpose of allowing unrelated patent defendants to 
insist on being tried separately would be undermined.  Section 299 
thus adopts a common standard for both joinder of defendants and 
consolidation of their cases for trial. 
83
 
Significantly, Section 299(b) clarifies that the mere allegation 
that each accused infringer has infringed the same patent is 
insufficient to meet the “same transaction or occurrence” requirement 
of Section 299(a) (and Rule 20 of the Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure).
84
  In other words, accused infringers may not (1) be 
joined as co-defendants in one action, or (2) have their otherwise 
separate actions be consolidated for trial, based solely on allegations 
that they each infringed the patents-in-suit. 
By delineating only two circumstances (joinder and 
consolidation for trial) in which multiple defendants cannot be forced 
to cooperate when their sole connection is the alleged infringing of a 
patent, Congress left the issue of consolidation for pre-trial purposes 
to the court’s discretion under Rule 42. 
In other words, NPEs can still litigate multiple lawsuits against 
multiple defendants by seeking consolidation of the separately filed 
cases for pre-trial proceedings. 
VIII.PRETRIAL CONSOLIDATION RULES ARE ABOUT JUDICIAL 
EFFICIENCY, NOT FAIRNESS TO DEFENDANTS 
Although Rule 42 “provides a mechanism for district courts to 
better conserve judicial resources via consolidation for certain 
common issues such as pretrial, Markman, or trial,”85 the opportunity 
to consolidate multiple actions for pre-trial purposes allows NPEs to 
regain some of the ground lost under the AIA. 
Rule 42(a) permits consolidation “[i]f actions before the court 
involve a common question of law or fact.”86  When a common 
question of law or fact exists, “[t]he court may (1) join the actions for 
hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions; (2) 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Leahy Smith Amerca Invents Act of 2011, 35 U.S.C. § 299(b) (2012). 
 85. Norman IP Holdings, LLC v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., No. 6:11-CV-495, 2012 WL 
3307942, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2012). 
86 Id. at *3. 
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consolidate the actions; or (3) issue any other orders to avoid 
unnecessary cost or delay.”87  In re EMC made clear that district 
courts have considerable discretion to consolidate cases: 
In exercising its discretion, the district court should keep in mind 
that even if joinder is not permitted under Rule 20, the district 
court has considerable discretion to consolidate cases for discovery 
and for trial under Rule 42 where venue is proper and there is only 
“a common question of law or fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a); see 9A 
Wright et al., supra, § 2382 (“[T]he existence of a common 
question by itself is enough to permit consolidation under Rule 
42(a), even if the claims arise out of independent transactions.”).
88
 
The fact of the matter is that in patent cases most of the pre-trial 
issues bear directly on legal questions concerning the patent; for 
example, claim construction and validity are common to all actions 
involving the same patent. 
For example, in Norman IP Holdings, LLC v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 
Judge Davis explained the goals and benefits of Rule 42 in light of the 
AIA: 
This Court has limited resources and constantly strives to employ 
efficient and cost-saving case-management procedures for the 
benefit of the parties, counsel, and the Court. See WordCheck 
Tech, LLC v. Alt-N Techs, Ltd.,No. 6:10-cv-457 (E.D. Tex. July 20, 
2011) (permitting limited early discovery to facilitate early 
mediation discussion); Parallel Networks, LLC v. Abercrombie & 
Fitch, No. 6:10-cv-111 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2011) (employing an 
early Markman proceeding to efficiently resolve a multi-defendant 
case). In response to the AIA’s joinder provision, plaintiffs now 
serially file multiple single-defendant (or defendant group) cases 
involving the same underlying patents. This presents 
administrative challenges for the Court and, left unchecked, wastes 
judicial resources by requiring common issues to be addressed 
individually for each case. For example, what was once a single 
motion to substitute parties (or join a plaintiff) becomes multiple 
motions. See, e.g., Klausner Techs., Inc. v. The Broadvox Holding 
Co., LLC, No. 6:11-cv-575 (E.D. Tex. June 6, 2012) (order 
granting motion to substitute plaintiff—over thirty similar motions 
were filed in related cases). These must each be processed by the 
Court and staff, including review of the underlying motions and 
docketing individual orders addressing each motion. More 
substantive motions, particularly where the same arguments are 
 
 87. Id. at *3-4. 
 88. In re EMC Corp., 677 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
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used in each individual case, present even more difficulties. There, 
the Court is required to waste time digesting duplicate arguments 
to ensure that new arguments are not hidden among the plethora of 
common arguments. 
  Federal Rule of Procedure 42 provides a mechanism for district 
courts to better conserve judicial resources via consolidation for 
certain common issues such as pretrial, Markman, or trial. The 
Federal Circuit has recently reiterated that district courts may 
consolidate matters that share a common question of law or fact. 
See In re EMC, 677 F.3d at 1360; see also C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Med. 
Components, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-32-TS-EJF, slip op. at 2-3 (D. Utah 
July 25, 2012) (recognizing that the AIA does not affect a district 
court’s ability to consolidate related patent cases for pretrial 
matters).
89
 
When asked how receptive he thought judges would be to 
requests to consolidate for pretrial purposes actions filed against 
individual defendants asserting the same patents, retired Judge 
Everingham stated:  
Most judges would do that even under the old law.  If there is an 
opportunity to do one Markman instead of seventeen, I am all for 
one . . . . There are some real inefficiencies from the multiple trial 
aspect and judges should decrease these inefficiencies by 
consolidating trials whenever possible.
90
 
A review of Docket Navigator’s Patent Litigation Statistics 
shows a significant increase in the number of motions to consolidate 
or relate actions filed since the AIA passed (Figure 3).
91
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 89. Norman IP Holdings, 2012 WL 3307942, at *4. 
 90. David O. Taylor et al., supra note 7, at *483; see also Abbott Diabetes Care, Inc. v. 
Dexcom, Inc., 2007 WL 2892707, at *3 (D. Del. Sept. 30, 2007) (“Decisions to 
consolidate cases are discretionary, but often courts balance considerations of efficiency, 
expenses, and fairness.”) 
 91. Table reflects motions to consolidate and/or relate as reported by Docket Navigator.  
See Patent Litigation Statistics, DocketNavigator (Oct. 8, 2013), 
https://www.docketnavigator.com/stats/.  Table also only reflects instances where the motion 
was granted, denied, and/or stipulated to by the parties.  It does not reflect partial grants/denials, 
nor instances where the motion was deemed moot by the court. 
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Figure 3. 2010 and 2011 Motions to Consolidate/Relate Actions 
92
 
 
 2010 2011 
 Granted Denied Granted Denied 
E.D. Texas 10 5 15 0 
N.D. Cal. 8 5 28 37 
D. Delaware 1 7 6 1 
 
Figure 4. 2012 and 2013 Motions to Consolidate/Relate Actions
93
 
 
 2012 2013 (YTD) 
 Granted Denied Granted Denied 
E.D. Texas 141 11 117 4 
N.D. Cal. 34 18 23 9 
D. Delaware 12 0 13 0 
 
While these statistics alone do not prove cause and effect, they 
are consistent with the general perception that NPEs are finding ways 
around the AIA by filing separate actions, against a large number of 
defendants for infringement of the same patents and consolidating 
 
 92. Table reflects motions to consolidate and/or relate as reported by Docket Navigator.  
Id.  Table also only reflects instances where the motion was granted, denied, and/or stipulated to 
by the parties.  It does not reflect partial grants/denials, nor instances where the motion was 
deemed moot by the court. 
 93. Table reflects motions to consolidate and/or relate as reported by Docket Navigator.  
Id.  Table also only reflects instances where the motion was granted, denied, and/or stipulated to 
by the parties.  It does not reflect partial grants/denials, nor instances where the motion was 
deemed moot by the court. 
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them for all pre-trial purposes. 
Given that only about 3% of patent cases actually go to trial, the 
likelihood that an NPE might have to conduct several trials against 
multiple defendants is low.
94
  As one commentator recognized, 
“[t]hese consolidated defendants cannot be tried together, but as trial 
is highly unlikely anyway, the only real effect that the AIA appears to 
have had is to require additional filing fees from the plaintiff.”95 
IX. THE MOVE TO DELAWARE 
To take advantage of the pre-trial consolidation mechanisms of 
Rule 42(a), however, NPEs must file the cases within the same 
district (and make sure the cases are assigned to the same court).
96
  
NPEs forced to maintain patent cases across multiple venues—rather 
than the single forum of choice—will face substantial increases in the 
costs and burdens of litigation.
97
  Having the cases assigned to 
multiple courts also provides the potential for inconsistent results on 
issues such as claim construction and validity. 
NPEs, however, appear to have found a way to overcome this 
obstacle.  When the AIA passed, some legal commentators 
hypothesized that it may shift the patent litigation spotlight to 
Delaware, where the vast majority of companies are incorporated.
98
  
Recent data reveals a trend among NPEs to file in the District of 
Delaware, confirming those earlier predictions.
99
 
The Eastern District of Texas has historically been considered a 
haven for patent troll litigation due to its reputation for having 
plaintiff-friendly rules and juries.
100
  This has not changed since the 
 
 94. Mark Lemley, Where To File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401, 413 (2010) 
(“While on average only 2.8% of patent cases go to trial, a far higher percentage make it to trial 
in the District of Delaware, the Eastern District of Texas, the Western District of Wisconsin, and 
the Eastern District of Virginia.”). 
 95. Brenna Legaard, Has Patent Reform Changed Texas?, LITIGATION JOURNAL, Spring 
2013, at 8-13, available at http://www.osblitigation.com/lj2013-spring.pdf. 
 96. Multidistrict litigation under 24 U.S.C. Section 1407 has also become a strategic 
solution to Section 299. 
 97. See Schwartz, supra note 42, at 383; Butler, supra note 69. 
 98. Ryan Davis, Del. May Eclipse Texas as Top Patent Venue Under AIA, LAW360 (Oct. 
28, 2011, 2:00 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/278301/del-may-eclipse-texas-as-top-
patent-venue-under-aia. 
 99. Press Release, Perkins Coie, Unprecedented Patent Case Concentration (Sept. 16, 
2013), available at http://www.perkinscoie.com/unprecedented-patent-case-concentration/. 
 100. Ted Frank, Why is the Eastern District of Texas home to so many patent trolls?, 
POINTOFLAW.COM, (Aug. 24, 2011, 11:35 AM), 
http://www.pointoflaw.com/archives/2011/08/why-is-the-east.php; Julie Creswell, So Small a 
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passage of the AIA; the Eastern District of Texas remains a popular 
forum for NPEs.  RPX data concluded that in 2012, the majority of 
NPE patent filings originated in the Eastern District of Texas 
representing 32% of new cases filed and 36% of total defendants.
101
  
The District of Delaware (24% of NPE cases filed in 2012; 20% of 
total defendants) came in second, followed by the Central District of 
California (10% of NPE cases filed in 2012; 9% of total defendants) 
as the forum of choice by NPEs.
102
 
In 2013, the headline changed: “Delaware Eclipses Texas as 
Patent Hot Spot.”103  According to a mid-year analysis of patent 
filings, in 2012, 992 patent cases were filed in the District of 
Delaware.
104
  Through September 10, 2013, 1015 patent cases had 
been filed in Delaware, surpassing the 920 patent cases filed in the 
Eastern District of Texas.
105
  The number of new patent cases filed in 
Delaware now amounts to 23.87% of the national total.
106
 
Delaware’s rise in popularity as a destination for NPEs can be 
the result of many factors.  One hypothesis is the District of 
Delaware’s relatively strict jurisprudence on issues of venue and 
forum non conveniens.  An analysis of transfer decisions from the 
District of Delaware shows that unless there is a related litigation 
pending in another district or the defendants’ operations are regional 
in nature, transferring a case out of Delaware is more difficult than in 
the Eastern District of Texas. 
For example, in Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Checkpoint 
Software Techs., Judge Stark denied defendants’ motion to transfer, 
reasoning that the Federal Circuit opinions finding an abuse of 
discretion in the Eastern District of Texas cases discussed above did 
not affect his analysis under Third Circuit law.
 107
  In so doing, Judge 
Stark spelled out the key differences between the Fifth Circuit 
jurisprudence and that of the Third Circuit with respect to transfer 
 
Town, So Many Patent Suits, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/business/24ward.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 101. RPX CORP., supra note 9, at 15. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Lawson, supra note 2. 
 104. Perkins Coie, supra note 99. 
 105. Id.; see also, Lawson, supra note 2. 
 106. Perkins Coie, supra note 99. 
 107. See, e.g., In re Microsoft Corp., 630 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (granting 
mandamus); In re Acer America Corp., 626 F.3d 1252 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (same); In re Hoffman-
La Roche Inc., 587 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (same); In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338 
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (same); In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (same). 
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motions: 
Transfer analysis under the law of the Third Circuit differs from 
that in the Fifth Circuit in at least the following significant 
respects: (i) plaintiff’s choice of forum is explicitly a factor to be 
weighed (and weighed heavily) in the Third Circuit, while in the 
Fifth Circuit, it is error to consider plaintiff’s preference as a 
separate factor, see TS Tech, 551 F.3d at 1320 (“Fifth Circuit 
precedent clearly forbids treating the plaintiff’s choice of venue as 
a distinct factor in the § l404(a) analysis.”); (ii) in the recent 
Federal Circuit cases, the parties generally were not incorporated 
in Texas, whereas in almost all the cases arising in this District, 
most if not all of the defendants (and often the plaintiffs as well) 
are incorporated in Delaware, which the Federal Circuit has 
recognized as an important factor, see Micron, 645 F.3d at 1332, 
2011 WL 1815975, at *18 (“[G]iven that both parties were 
incorporated in Delaware, they had both willingly submitted to suit 
there, which weighs in favor of keeping the litigation in 
Delaware.”); and (iii) the Fifth Circuit has endorsed a “100 mile 
rule,” which provides that “when the distance between a plaintiff’s 
chosen venue for trial and the potential transferee venue is more 
than 100 miles, the factor of inconvenience to witnesses increases 
in direct relationship to the additional distance to be traveled,” TS 
Tech, 551 F.3d at 1320 (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted); see also Genentech, 566 F.3d at 1343, while no such rule 
has been recognized in the Third Circuit.
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The District of Delaware has historically placed a heavy 
emphasis on a plaintiff’s choice of forum if it is the plaintiff’s “home 
turf,” in which case it is presumptively entitled to “paramount 
deference.”109  In Delaware, an entity’s “home turf” includes its state 
of incorporation, and there is little sympathy for parties, namely 
defendants with nationwide sales and operations, who are later sued 
there.
110
 
In In re Link_A_Media Devices, however, the Federal Circuit 
 
 108. Intellectual Ventures I v. Checkpoint Software, 797 F. Supp. 2d 472, 487 (D. Del. 
2011) (evaluating the private and public interest factors under Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 
F.3d 873, 879 (3d. Cir.1995)). 
 109. In re Link_A_Media Devices Corp., 662 F.3d 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 110. Netgear, Inc. v. Ruckus Wireless, Inc., No. 10-999-SLR, 2011 WL 3236043, at *3 
(D. Del. Aug. 5, 2011) (denying motion to transfer and stating, “As always, the court stresses 
that, because defendant is a Delaware corporation, it has no reason to complain about being sued 
in Delaware”); XPRT Ventures, LLC v. Ebay, Inc., No. 10-595-SLR, 2011 WL 2270402, at *3 
(D. Del. June 8, 2011) (denying motion to transfer even though several defendants were 
incorporated in Delaware and several—including plaintiff—had their principal place of business 
outside of Delaware). 
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criticized a District of Delaware decision denying transfer for its 
“heavy reliance” on a party’s state of incorporation in its Jumara 
analysis, stating that the court “placed far too much weight on the 
plaintiff’s choice of forum,” and that its “heavy reliance on the fact 
that [the defendant] was incorporated in Delaware was similarly 
inappropriate.”111  Later, in In re Altera, the Federal Circuit again 
evaluated a petition for writ of mandamus concerning the District of 
Delaware’s denial of a motion to transfer and stated that, 
“[defendants’] status as Delaware corporations is not entitled to 
controlling weight insofar as no office or employees are located in 
Delaware.”112  Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit denied mandamus 
and distinguished In re Link_A_Media where all of the parties were 
Delaware corporations.
113
 
Whether these recent Federal Circuit decisions addressing the 
District of Delaware’s venue analysis will translate into more 
transfers out of Delaware remains to be seen.  But the raw numbers 
from Docket Navigator’s patent litigation statistics suggests some 
reprieve for defendants with more transfer motions granted in 2013 
following In re Link_A_Media than in previous years: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 111. In re Link_A_Media Devices Corp., 662 F.3d 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 112. In re Altera Corp., 494 F. App’x 52 (Fed. Cir. July 20, 2012). 
 113. Id. at 54 (“On that view, this case is clearly distinguishable; in its thorough opinion, 
the district court endeavored to evaluate each of the forum non conveniens factors in light of the 
same arguments raised in the petition, and there is no clear indication that the court failed to 
meaningfully consider the merits of the transfer motion. Moreover, as noted above, in this case, 
unlike Link_A_Media, there are rational grounds for denying transfer given that all of the parties 
(not just a single defendant) had incorporated in Delaware and some witnesses would potentially 
find Delaware more convenient.”). 
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Figure 5. Delaware Transfer of Venue Orders (Convenience)
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Year Granted Denied 
2010 5 2 
2011 7 12 
2012 14 18 
2013 20
115
 13 
 
CONCLUSION 
Our review of the combined effect of the enactment of the AIA 
and the evolving jurisprudence regarding motions to transfer in 
various judicial districts reveals that the statistically significant 
increase in NPE patent filings in the District of Delaware cannot be 
dismissed as a statistical anomaly, but rather appears to be the fruit of 
a calculated strategy adopted by the NPE bar to circumvent if not the 
letter, at least the spirit of the anti-joinder provision of the AIA.  Until 
and unless the Federal Circuit harmonizes the transfer jurisprudence 
 
 114. Table reflects the outcome of motions to transfer for forum non conveniens as 
reported by Docket Navigator.  See Patent Litigation Statistics, DocketNavigator (Oct. 8, 2013), 
https://www.docketnavigator.com/stats/.  Table also only reflects instances where the motion 
was granted, denied, and/or stipulated to by the parties.  It does not reflect partial grants/denials, 
nor instances where the motion was deemed moot by the court. 
 115. Our analysis of the orders granting and denying transfer motions reveal an interesting 
split within the District of Delaware at least with respect to the “home turf” issue.  In recent 
opinions, it is clear that Judges Sleet and Andrews do not consider an entity’s state of 
incorporation to be its “home turf.”  In other words, a plaintiff’s choice of forum is not accorded 
paramount weight when it chose to sue in its state of incorporation but is not physically located 
there or has chosen to maintain operations elsewhere.  Judge Stark, on the other hand, disagrees 
stating that Delaware is “home turf” as long as a company is incorporated in Delaware 
regardless of location of principal place of business.  Compare Signal Tech LLC v. Analog 
Devices, Inc., No. 11-CV-01073, 2012 WL 1134723 (D. Del. Apr. 3, 2012) (J. Andrews), and 
Joao Control & Monitoring Sys. v. Ford, 12-CV-01479, 2013 WL 4496644 (D. Del. Aug. 21, 
2013) (J. Sleet), with Graphics Prop. Holdings, Inc. v. ASUS Computer Int’l, Inc., No. 12-CV-
00210-LPS, 2013 WL 3295618, at *7-8 (D. Del. June 28, 2013) (J. Stark) (“The Court agrees 
with those cases that include a corporate entity’s state of incorporation as part of its ‘home 
turf.’”).  For example, of the twenty transfer motions granted in the District of Delaware in 
2013, ten were issued by Judge Andrews, and seven issued by Judge Sleet. 
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between Third Circuit and the Fifth Circuit district courts, it is likely 
that this trend will continue and Delaware will take the “mantle” of 
forum of choice for NPEs away from the Eastern District of Texas. 
 
